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See William P. Danielczyk, president and CEO for Ambulatory Healthcare Corp. of
America, Remarks at the Ambulatory Healthcare Corp. of America Briefing at the National
Press Club, Wash., D.C. (Aug. 12, 1998), (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IN THE NEWS
File. “The health care industry represents 13.7[%] of our gross domestic product–only second
to the defense industry. But yet, we are faced with escalating costs, a decrease in competition,
an alarming increase of fraud and abuse scandals across our industry, the lowest possible
confidence by the consumer and most importantly, a lack of leadership from within our own
industry.” Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many health experts argue that “the American health system is a work in
progress; it can and . . . will get better.”2 Unfortunately, for individuals like Barbara
Garvey, the health care system had not progressed fast enough to save her life.3 In
1994, Barbara Garvey was vacationing with her husband in Hawaii when large
bruises began to appear on her body.4 She immediately went to a local clinic and
was admitted into the oncology department at the Queen’s Medical Center in
Hawaii.5 After trying remedial procedures, her doctors diagnosed her with aplastic
2
See Paul M. Ellwood Jr. & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work in Progress,
276 JAMA 1083-86 (1996).
3

See Transcripts of Clinton Remarks in Patients’ Bill of Rights Roundtable, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, July 20, 1998.
4

See Id.

5

See Id.
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anemia and recommended that she undergo a bone-marrow transplant.6 Several days
into Mrs. Garvey’s treatment, her Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), a thirdparty payor (like self-insured employers),7 conducted a prospective utilization review
process—in which the third-party payor determines whether or not it will reimburse
the patient for a medical procedure.8 Upon completing the procedure, her HMO
refused to pay for her treatment in Hawaii and furthermore, ordered that she return to
Chicago where she could be treated by one of the HMO-designated providers
(doctors).
Following a last-ditch plea by Mrs. Garvey’s husband, their HMO reiterated its
refusal to pay for her bone-marrow transplant in Hawaii and she was forced to fly
back to Chicago on a commercial airline.9 Mrs. Garvey’s condition left her without a
functional immune system. As Mr. Garvey testified at a roundtable sponsored by
President Clinton on Patient’s Bill of Rights legislation: “We had to take her from
isolation, put her on a commercial flight and expose her to all the impurities of
recirculated air [and] the pressure changes, which most people here it wouldn’t affect
at all, but [to] somebody in her condition could, and may have, proved fatal.”10
Due to her weakened state, Mrs. Garvey suffered a stroke in mid-flight. Nine
days later she died, never becoming stable enough to receive the bone-marrow
transplant in Chicago.11
6

See Id.

7

See Kathleen J. McKee, Liability of Third-Party Health-Care Payor for Injury Arising
from Failure to Authorize Required Treatment, 56 A.L.R. 5th 737, n.4 (1998). Third-party
payor is a term used to describe entities responsible for paying health care services made on
behalf of plan participants. Id. Examples of third-party payors are: insurance companies,
managed care entities (HMOs, PPOs, IPAs), Medicare and Medicaid, and self-insured
employers. Id.
8

See Id. at § 2(a) Although the HMO demanded Mrs. Garvey’s return, her doctor in
Hawaii said she was not stable enough to be moved that far of a distance. Transcript of
Clinton Remarks in Patients’ Bill of Rights Roundtable, supra note 3. Mr. Garvey phoned
Chicago and spoke to a doctor working for the HMO. Id. The doctor agreed with Mr. Garvey
that his wife was in no condition to be moved. Id. The same day that this conversation took
place, the doctor working for the HMO, who agreed that Mrs. Garvey should not be removed,
was taken off the Garvey case. DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COMMITTEES, SPECIAL REPORTS:
PATIENTS BEFORE PROFITS: 18 REASONS FOR HMO REFORM, (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.senate.gov/~dpc.patients_rights/> [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORTS: PATIENTS
BEFORE PROFITS]. A new doctor assumed control and demanded Mrs. Garvey must return to
Chicago at the Garvey’s expense. Id. Mr. Garvey requested a medivac to ensure and safe and
sterile travel. Id. Their HMO refused, citing expense and awaited Mrs. Garvey’s return in
Chicago. Id. see also Larry Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 356 (1994).
Prospective utilization review is a process where a third-party payor (self-insured employer or
HMO, among others) deems whether or not treatment is medically necessary. Id. Upon its
decision as to whether or not the treatment is medically necessary, the third-party payor
informs the patient and/or the provider on whether or not the third-party payor will grant or
deny payment. Id.
9

See Transcripts of Clinton Remarks in Patient’s Bill of Rights Roundtable, supra note 3.

10

See Id.

11

See Id.
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While Mrs. Garvey’s HMO’s acts were reprehensible, even more disturbing is
the fact that Mrs. Garvey’s surviving family was denied any and all state law claims
because of a preemption clause in the 1974 Employment Retirement Income
Securities Act (ERISA). The preemption clause denied Mrs. Garvey’s family all
state remedies and affords her family only those remedies set forth in ERISA. The
clause states, in part, that ERISA itself “supersede[s] any and all State laws” as they
relate to health-benefit plans.12 In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. W. Dedeaux, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a state law cause of action is preempted by [the 1974
Employment Retirement Income Securities Act] if [the action] relates to an
employee-benefit plan.13 The Court held that because ERISA already includes a civil
enforcement mechanism—which affords patients the ability to bring a civil action to
obtain compensation for plan benefits refused, injunctions against refusals by plans
to pay benefits, and attorney’s fees—Congress did not intend to permit other
remedies such as punitive damages in state courts for tortious claims by plan
participants.14
Compounding this disturbing situation, the lower federal courts maintain that
while they are troubled by apparent injustices being committed against patients like
Mrs. Garvey, it is not their responsibility to remedy the situation. They suggest,
rather, it is Congress’ responsibility to revisit ERISA and to reevaluate the
preemption clause and its adverse effect on patients.15
Although unjust and highly controversial, the Garvey incident is not unique
within the American health care system experience.16 Incidents like this have
prompted serious debate in Congress as to whether immunity for third-party payors
from state law actions is a form of immunity with which a country with arguably the
best health care and legal systems in the world can live. In response to the Garvey
ordeal and incidents like it, many entities—doctors, lawyers, patients, and politicians
(Republican and Democrat)—argue that a patient’s bill of rights law must be passed
that includes a measure eliminating the preemption clause so as to protect patients
from third-party payors who are sacrificing medical ethics to business profits.17
Proponents of the bill state that approximately 125 million people currently enrolled
in health care plans have no opportunity for substantive legal remedy, because their
third-party payors are exempt from being sued for punitive damages for injuries
12

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998).

13

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).

14

Id. at 52. The ERISA civil enforcement mechanism is located at 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(1999). In addition to the civil enforcement mechanism, ERISA provides two other remedies:
(1) 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1999): Criminal penalties for violations of the disclosure and reporting
provisions of ERISA; and (2) 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1999): notice and a reasonable review must
be afforded to plan participants for any claims denied. Id. at 53.
15

See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Congress: Give Injured Patients Legal
Recourse
By
Closing
the
ERISA
Loophole
(visited
Mar.
3,
1999)
<http://www.apa.org/practice/erisaloophole.html>.
16

See generally SPECIAL REPORTS: PATIENTS BEFORE PROFITS, supra note 8.

17

The term—patient’s bill of rights legislation—does not encompass one bill per se, but is
generally used as a generic term for all proposed legislation that surrounds Congress’s current
deliberation on the state of health care.
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caused by their decisions to, among others, delay treatment or deny procedures
recommended by the patients’ doctors.18 Both consumer advocates and medicaldoctor associations urge Congress to eliminate, or significantly alter, the federalpreemption clause so as to empower people like Mrs. Garvey’s surviving family to
use the legal system as a means to obtain legal redress in state courts for tortious acts
committed by third-party payors.19
Consumer advocates, nor their opponents among HMOs and other third-party
payors, like to admit that these issues are not cut-and-dried. They cannot be easily
resolved by simple alterations to ERISA. For example, while it appears that Mrs.
Garvey’s HMO committed an act that should be subject to legal liability, third-party
payors and their lobbyists maintain that they should not be subject to inconsistent,
emotional, and outrageously high judgments in state courts, because logical and
health-related reasons could have accounted for her HMO’s refusal to cover the
prescribed treatment in Hawaii.20 Furthermore, they argue that while doctors are
seriously concerned for the health and welfare of patients, doctors make mistakes,
and their concern with earning a sizable income can affect their ability to provide
quality care.21 Therefore, third-party payor advocates maintain certain health care

18
See POLICY.COM: THE POLICY NEWS & INFORMATION SERVICE, Can Managed Care Be
Managed: Erisa Reform, (visited Jan. 31, 1999) <http://www.policy.com/issue
wk/98/0608/060898d.html>. Consumer advocates argue that health care providers (doctors)
and their managed care companies need to assume more responsibility for their actions. Id.
Managed Care Companies argue if the ERISA exemption is lifted, the costs of premiums
(amount employers pay for their employees health care coverage) will undoubtedly go up. Id.
Furthermore, in addition to the increased premiums, managed care companies argue this will
naturally lead to an alarming increase in the number of uninsured people in the country. Id.
19

Throughout this Article, when referring to state law, the author is encompassing state
medical malpractice laws. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (Pocket ed. 1996). These
references do include state law or common law which place a general duty of reasonable care
on an individual who performs on behalf of another for which a breach of that duty will
subject the breaching part to liability for damages caused by the breach. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 400 (Pocket ed. 1996).
20

Interview with M. Ruth Coleman, president and CEO of Health Design Plus, in Hudson,
Ohio (Feb. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Interview with Coleman]. The HMO could have made their
decision to deny her the treatment in Hawaii because the bone marrow transplant was too
much for Mrs. Garvey’s body to handle. Id. Furthermore, there is a real possibility of medical
malpractice by the doctor and the HMO may have wanted to protect itself from liability for
allowing an unapproved provider to administer health care to their patient. Id. M. Ruth
Coleman stated that she recently had a client, whose employee’s doctor prescribed that the
employer’s employee needed a bone marrow transplant. Id. The employer was concerned
with such an extreme measure and wanted to obtain a separate opinion on the matter. Id. M.
Ruth Coleman’s company, Health Design Plus, obtained three reputable doctors from the
Northeast Ohio region. Id. They were informed of the matter and told that the original doctor
prescribed a bone marrow transplant. Interview with Coleman, supra note 21. Following the
review of this matter, all three doctors stated if this employee-patient goes through with the
bone marrow transplant, she will die on the operating table. Id. See also MICHAEL L.
MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DOCTORS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 156-60 (1997).
21
See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 298. In a Forbes magazine article, in 1986, Dr. James
Silverman, chief of staff at Stanford University Medical Center, stated, “[Back then] There
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claim decisions, while seemingly callous, are in fact calculated to provide costefficient solutions that are in the best interest of the patient and that seek to avoid
possible mistakes by doctors.22 Lastly, this free-market contingent of third-party
payors argue that over the past twenty years, America’s insured patients have been
afforded health care at virtually no cost to themselves.23 The insured American
patient has come to expect quality affordable heath care at no financial risk, even
though the costs of such care could produce “an irrational health care system” in
which health costs will never stop increasing.24 Therefore, this free-market
contingent concludes that if America’s insured patients’ unrealistic assumptions
motivate significant alteration to, or elimination of, the preemption clause, they will
be forced to increase premiums to offset any increased liability costs. If that does
not work, they threaten that they will exit the health care benefits business altogether
and leave patients to fend for themselves in securing affordable health insurance.25

was no shortage of work, and everyone was happy. At the beginning of the year, doctors
would target their income and reach it in a number of ways. You could always charge for lab
tests you didn’t do.” Id. In the magazine, Mother Jones, Alan Stone, professor of law and
medicine at Harvard, stated, “when you introduced the profit motive into health care, the
whole industry became permeated with greed.” Id. at 299-300. This “uncontrolled greed” is
the basis for any managed care situation that we must deal with today.” Id. at 299.
22

See Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed
Care, 23 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 236, 240 (1995). A patient’s legal relationship to her HMO is
one that is based on contract principles. Id. See Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts, (St.
Paul: West, vol. 1, 1993). The elements that underlie and enforceable contract are: an
exchange of promises; a fair bargaining process; and a meeting of the minds. See Mariner,
supra note 23, at 240. According to Wendy Mariner, there are fundamental differences
between the relationship created by contract principles and a relationship based on fiduciary
obligations from doctor to patient. Id. For example, a doctor has a fiduciary responsibility to
act in the best interests of her patient; whereas, in a contractual relationship, if an HMO does
not provide care that is not set forth in the contract, it is not treating its patients unethically or
unjustly, even if the patient, such as Mrs. Garvey, needs the care. Id.
23

See Mariner, supra note 22, at 240. “For decades, employers providing health insurance
for the employee was like the employer buying them a mink coat every-year . . . we have
created in this country an expectation that’s very different than a lot of other countries in that
the consumer expects the best, that they have the rights to be treated at the ‘nth degree’ until
they draw their last breath . . . this isn’t necessarily negative, but the fact remains, we have that
expectation.” Id. See also Alycia C. Regan, Note, Regulating the Business of Medicine:
Models for Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 684
n.12 (1997). See also MARK A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS’
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 55-57 (1993). The vast majority of health care costs are paid through
third-party payers. Id. at 13-14. Therefore, consumers do not have to assume any kind of
substantive economic responsibility. Id. The only adverse economic effect to the patient
comes through an annual increase in premium payments. Id.
24
See RANDOM HOUSE UNABR. DICTIONARY 1026 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1993).
See also Emily Friedman, United States’ Health Care System Called ‘Irrational,’ 58 HOSPS.
33 (1984).
25
See Telephone interview with David Eubanks, manager, Benefits Administration for
Marathon Oil Co. and chair of the National Employee Benefits Institute Foundation Policy
Board (Feb. 26, 1999). [hereinafter Telephone interview with Eubanks].
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On the other hand, patient and consumer-rights groups have their own
substantive arguments. These advocates point out that while third-party payors
predict that the elimination of the preemption clause will be too costly for their
businesses, they neglect to inform the public that the CEOs of the third-party payor
companies and corporations are making astronomical salaries.26 Families USA, a
consumer rights group, studied health care companies’ filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.27 In 1997, it found:
The 25 highest paid executives in the 15 companies studied made $128.6
million in annual compensation, excluding unexercised stock options.
The average compensation for these 25 executives was over $5.1 million
per executive. The median compensation for these [same] 25 executives
was $3.5 million.28
Jamie Court, director of Consumers for Quality Care, a California-based
watchdog group states, ‘[f]or-profit HMOs take as much as thirty cents of every
premium dollar for their own profit and overhead, so the real fear of HMOs is that
reform legislation[, elimination of the preemption clause,] will cut profits and
redirect dollars from companies’ coffers to patients’ care.’29 Consumer-rights groups
maintain that the idea of eliminating the preemption clause should not be squelched
by a highly-suspect fear that third-party payors would be forced to fold their
operations under the burden of resulting lawsuits and increased liability insurance.30
Consumer-rights groups also posit that when a self-insured employer or HMO denies
necessary medical treatment to the employee/patient, she could suffer irreparable
damage—e.g., death or serious injury.31 Therefore, according to Terre McFillen
Hall, executive director of the Center for Patient Advocacy: “If HMOs [or selfinsured employers] are making medical decisions, and in essence that’s what they’re
doing . . . then they should be held accountable just like any doctor who makes
medical decisions.”32 McFillen Hall further argues that since federal courts have
predominantly refused to hold third-party payors liable until the ERISA preemption
26
See FAMILIES USA, CORPORATE COMPENSATION
<http://www.familiesusa.org/ceo2htm>.

ON

AMERICA’S HMOS, (Sept. 1998)

27

See Id.

28

See Id. Stephen Wiggins, chairman and CEO of Oxford Health Plans, Inc. made
$30,735,093 in 1997. Id. Wilson Taylor, chairman and CEO of CIGNA Corp. made $12,
456,169 in 1997. Id. The report also found: “The 25 executives with the largest unexercised
stock option packages in 1997 had stock options valued at $290.4 million. The average value
of unexercised stock options for these 25 executives was $11.6 million. The median
unexercised stock option package for these executives was $7.3 million.” Id.
29

See THE FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, HMO INDUSTRY TAKES
SCARE TACTICS ROAD: “JOB KILLER” RAP MEANT TO STOP HMO REFORMS, (visited Mar. 3,
1999)
<http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/public_hts/medical/press/me/
00137.htm>
(quoting Jamie Court, director of Consumers for Quality Care).
30

Id.

31

See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 15.

32

See Id. (citing BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT (Apr. 20,
1998) (quoting Terre McFillen Hall)).
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clause is altered or eliminated, it strengthens and intensifies the arguments for
Congressional elimination of the clause.33 Consumer advocates reason that the thirdparty payors must take a step back and “concede [that] there are fundamental
problems which gave rise to the [patient’s] ‘bill-of-rights’ movement in the first
place[, and, that] the failure of managed care in many instances [was its inability] to
reconcile cost containment with more humane considerations.”34 They conclude that
the elimination of the preemption clause would be as good a beginning as any in
initiating this reconciliation.
Pure guilt or innocence do not exist in the discussion about the fate of the
preemption clause. To move into the next millennium with an efficient, but humane
health care system, this article argues that the various entities—patient, provider, and
third-party payor—must each assume responsibility in providing for and accepting
quality health benefits at an affordable cost. For over twenty-years, the preemption
clause has served our health care system for better or for worse. Although
increasingly troubled by the preemption clause’s effect on patient’s health, the many
federal courts hold that the preemption clause language is clear and that it is
Congress’s responsibility to remedy the harm being inflicted on individuals such as
Mrs. Garvey.35
This article explores the arguments surrounding the fate of the preemption clause
and argues that Congress must work to preserve self-insured employers’
accountability to its employees while concurrently retaining the services of selfinsured employers in the health care business. Part II analyzes the federal
government’s relationship with the health care industry, concentrating selectively on
four episodes of federal regulation which helped create the health care crisis that we
encounter today—the Hill-Burton Act, the Congressional amendments to the Health
Professions Educational Assistance Act, the advent of Medicare, and ERISA.36
Armed with this understanding, Congress’s evaluation of health care issues,
specifically the elimination of the preemption clause from ERISA, may be able to
avoid repeating history by committing the same mistakes as have been committed
over the past fifty-years of federal regulation of the health care industry. Part III
focuses on various arguments as to whether Congress should amend ERISA to allow
participants to sue self-insured employers and HMOs for punitive damages under
state tort law.37 It explains why and how the preemption clause was drafted into
ERISA, explores the federal courts’ interpretations of the clause and the arguments
surrounding its abolition, and analyzes the possible repercussions that such a
measure, if passed, would have on four major entities—patient, provider, selfinsured employer, and health care entities. Part IV attempts to resolve the current
33

See Id.

34

Patients’ Bill of Rights Deserves Consideration, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER PROPERTY &
CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MANAGEMENT, Feb. 9, 1998, at 40.
35

See supra note 15.

36

Letter from M. Ruth Coleman, president and CEO of Health Design Plus, a national
Health Care Managed Organization, to Damon H. Taylor, Article Author (Feb. 5, 1999) (on
file with author).
37

See Bulletin from The National Employee Benefits Institute Foundation to all associate
members on, WASHINGTON STATUS REPORT, (Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with author).
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arguments on eliminating the ERISA preemption clause by providing some practical
suggestions to manage our looming health care crisis.
II. SELECTIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
For the last fifty-years, most American patients indulged themselves with the
benefits of a quality health care system. Joseph Califano, an author and veteran of
the health care industry, states, “Americans have gotten more tests, seen more
physicians, spent more time in hospitals for minor medical procedures, taken more
drugs, had more medical examinations, and been subjected to more unnecessary
surgery than any other people in the world.”38 Furthermore, the patient has enjoyed
the miracles of modern medicine at virtually no cost to herself or her family.39 “By
the late 1960s, approximately ninety-percent of the United States population had
private-or public health insurance that reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis just
about any care doctors and hospitals deemed necessary.”40 America’s insatiable
appetite for more and better health care has not, however, equated to a wonderful
health care system today.41 What resulted were more problems: Congress’s
unwillingness to refuse the nation’s health care desires; doctors want higher fees;
hospitals more facilities and beds to fill; and patients demanding more services at a
cheaper cost. For every law or regulation passed, it seemed, there was an
undesirable outcome, a bigger and more formidable problem than the one addressed
in the legislation. This section illustrates this point by selectively reviewing a series
of legislative events: the Hill-Burton Act, Congressional amendments to the Health
Professions Educational Assistance Act, the advent of Medicare, and the 1974
Employee Retirement Income Securities Act.
These legislative actions built the foundation for the current discussion on the
fate of the ERISA preemption clause. Future deliberations must be grounded in past
lessons learned rather than upon highly publicized, often anecdotal, instances of
managed health care abuse.42
A. The Hill-Burton Act
From 1789 through 1945, the United States government’s involvement in health
care was limited to creating a Marine Hospital Service in 1789, studying infectious

38
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: WHO LIVES? WHO
DIES? WHO PAYS? 56 (1984).
39

See Id.

40

See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 289. See also Interview with Coleman, supra note 21.
The fee-for-service system places a pre-prescribed price for each service provided to the
patient. Id.
41

See Coleman, supra note 20. See also CALIFANO JR., supra note 37, at 57. Califano
states as a result of the early-dollar coverage, unlimited choices, and full benefits, the blessed
benefit of health insurance is no longer viewed as a blessing, but as a credit card. Id. “The
health insurance card that let us enter the third-party, fee-for-service, cost-plus health care
reimbursement system provided only the illusion of a free lunch. In reality, we have all paid
for this meal. And what we’ve paid has created a health industry colossus.” Id.
42

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 57.
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diseases in the early twentieth century, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s toying with the
idea of inserting health benefits into the 1935 Social Security proposal.43 This
changed when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Immediately, the
war inspired the nation to defend American freedom and world democracy from
imperialists, fascists, and dictators alike. The war effort focused, in part, on creating
an effective health care industry, one that could provide adequate health training and
medical research to thousands of nurses and doctors who would be drafted into the
armed forces.44 By the end of the war, the federal government was funneling large
sums of money into health care research and supporting this hot new focus.45
In 1946, state and local governments did not possess the capital to continue
building hospitals as fast as society needed them.46 Therefore, the President Trumanled Congress passed the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act.47 This
began a massive buildup of hospitals and hospital beds.48 During the initial stages,
the program spent upwards of $700 million on hospital expansion and created
170,000 new hospital beds.49 By the time the Act expired, it had served as the
43

See Id. at 47.

44

See Id.

45

See Id. In 1930 the National Institute of Health (NIH) was provided with an annual
budget of $50,000. Id. Once the war ended the federal government needed a mechanism
which could assume the newly fostered medical military system, they chose the National
Institute of Health. Id. In 1947, the NIH had a budget of $8 million. Id. Moreover, by 1960,
the NIH budget stood at a hefty $400 million, and in 1984 the budget hit $4 billion. Id. In
1944, Congress decided to empower the U.S. Surgeon General with the ability to conduct
research on both diseases and the disabilities of man (most likely, Congress was focused on
providing care for the men wounded throughout the WWII). Id. “World War II GI Bill
education benefits paid for graduate training of doctors to do research at hospitals. The
postwar expansion of the Veterans Administration hospital system” created a need for federal
dollars to support their research efforts. Id. at 48.
46

See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 161

47

See J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH & ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, CONTROVERSY ABOUT
AMERICAN HOSPITALS: FUNDING, OWNERSHIP, AND PERFORMANCE 33 (1987). In addition to
the new found fervor for health care in this country, it became increasingly obvious that there
were many communities, small towns, and rural areas especially, that could not support a
public or voluntary hospital. Id. “Funds were made available under the Hill-Burton program
for both new construction and renovation of existing facilities . . . . Hill-Burton funding was
allocated to states according to their per capita income and health needs—the states that were
most ‘underbedded’ received the largest sums of the money, and those with the most beds for
their population received proportionately smaller sums. The legislation was intended not
simply to provide beds but to provide them in areas of acute shortage.” Id. The Hill-Burton
Act had three simple, yet distinct goals: (1) to motivate the states to complete both a needs
assessment and inventory of their hospital infrastructure; (2) to provide federal monies for the
construction of new hospitals; and (3) to stimulate local investments, statutorily required by
the federal government to receive federal assistance. Id.
48

See Id. See also CALIFANO, supra note 38, at 49. When the law expired in 1978 “the
program had used $4.4 billion in federal money as leverage to get state and local governments
to ante an additional $9.1 billion. These funds built almost half the hospital beds in use in
1985.” Id.
49

See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 161.
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catalyst for creating more than 500,000 beds.50 Overall, the Hill-Burton Act caused a
30% increase in voluntary hospitals and a 119% increase in hospital beds.51
Unfortunately, Congress miscalculated or rather, did not foresee, the possible
repercussions of subsidizing the construction of large numbers of hospitals.
While the increase in hospital beds was instrumental in providing the public—
urban and rural alike—with quality health care facilities, the Hill-Burton Act created
a massive infrastructure needful of patients to occupy its newly-made beds.52 This
legislation marked the first miscalculation, in a series of well-intentioned, but shortsighted, regulatory measures by Congress. Ironically, the second short-sighted
attempt to regulate the health care system involved Congress’s desire to solve the
problem caused, in part, by its miscalculation in the Hill-Burton Act—the unusedbed dilemma.
B. Congressional Amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act
From the late-1940s through the early-1950s, the delivery of health care in
America consisted of an increased number of hospitals supplying an increased
number of services to patients who, as they learned more about their health,
demanded an increased number of services.53 Unfortunately, doctors were having
serious difficulty handling the increased patient demand for health care.54 This
increased demand, coupled with the Hill-Burton Act’s adverse impact on the health
care infrastructure,55 caused the traditional economic analysis to go awry—hospitals
were not being used to their capacities, patient’s health care needs were increasing,
and as a result, doctors realized an opportunity and began to increase their fees.56
The federal government intervened as Congress passed a “broad package of
amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act to provide funds
to encourage medical schools to double—from 8,000 to 16,000—the number of
physicians graduating each year.”57 The hospital lobbying groups convinced
Congress that training more doctors would increase competition, which would
naturally decrease fees. Moreover, training more doctors would solve both the
50

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 49.

51

See HOLLINGSWORTH & HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 47, at 34.

52

See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20.

53

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 78.

54

See Id.

55

See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20.

56

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 37, at 78. Many in the federal government felt that the
doctors had purposely limited the number of doctors graduating to keep their prices from
decreasing. Id.
57

See Id. The then Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services became
very concerned with this increase in the number of doctors being trained. Id. at 79. The
secretary requested the assistance of the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory
Committee (GMENAC) to help in determining the number of doctors expected to be working
in society up until the year 2000. Id. at 80. The GMENAC took three years to complete its
study and concluded that by the turn of the century, this country would have considerably
more doctors than we would need. Id.
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increased demand for services and the unused-bed problem. Unfortunately,
Congress, once again, miscalculated the effect their blanket regulation would have
on the heath-care industry.
Although the beds were beginning to fill up and the patients’ health care needs
were being addressed, the large infusion of physicians into the market place resulted
in an increase, not a decrease in costs.58 In retrospect, health care specialist, John
Califano Jr. states:
More doctors meant decidedly higher costs, and more specialists meant a
richer mix of medical services, a one-two punch ending with an uppercut
that sent the cost of health care through the roof. In a system where
doctors could charge reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees and
specialists commanded a premium, doubling the number of physicians
more than doubled what they billed, largely as a result of a
disproportionate increase in the number of specialists, who got the highest
fees.59
The old adage, “for every action, there is an equal reaction and opposite
reaction,” should have been ringing in the ears of Congress and the nation. While
the Hill-Burton Act and the amendments to the Health Professions Educational
Assistance Act were classic actions of good faith, well-intentioned government
regulation, they resulted in unexpected outcomes, thus contributing to our current
health care crisis.60
C. The Advent of Medicare
By no means were the Hill-Burton Act and the amendments to the Health
Professions Educational Assistance Act the sole culprits in creating the present day
health care crisis.61 In 1964, newly appointed president Lyndon B. Johnson entered
the White House carrying with him a dream that Medicare legislation would be
passed to provide health care for the elderly and the poor.62 He stated in his first

58

See Id. “In the economic upside-down cake of medicine . . . more doctors do not
necessarily mean lower prices. Indeed, in a provider-controlled system, the more doctors, the
more medical services; the more surgeons, the more surgery; the more psychiatrists, the more
fifty minute patient hours on couches; the more specialists, the more referrals to specialists.”
Id. The federal government did not account for the reality that physicians controlled prices
and services and drastic increase of specialization. Id.
59

See Id. at 80. Reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees are terms taken from the
Medicare legislation discussed in section II( c) of this Article.
60

See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. (The increase in beds combined with the
increase in doctors created a huge increase in health care costs. This increase in costs
continues to escalate as this article is being written). Id.
61

See Id.

62
See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 50. Johnson wanted a broad range of measures to be
passed by Congress. Id. He wanted to provide health care for the elderly and the poor. Id.
See also ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW 72 (7th ed. 1996). Medicare
was created when Title XVIII was added to the 1965 Social Security Act. Id. This title added
a two part program for health insurance which covered the elderly citizens. Id. Part A dealt
with hospital insurance programs and Part B dealt with supplementary medical insurance
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speech to Congress, “We are going to fight for medical care for the aged as long as
we have breath in our bodies.”63 Unfortunately, while Johnson was rightfully
concerned with access to medical care, he did not envision, and was not interested in,
the long term ramifications that such a program would have on the future of health
care. When Johnson demanded that the Medicare bill be moved out of the
committee, lobbyists argued that the bill would cost “a half-billion dollars to make
the changes in reimbursement standards to get the bill out of the Senate Finance
Committee.”64 Johnson was alleged to respond, “Five hundred million. Is that all?”65
To win this fight, President Johnson made serious concessions to powerful
lobbying groups—the American Medical Association (AMA), the American
Hospital Association, Blue Cross and other insurance carriers, among others—in
order to obtain support for Medicare.66 When Medicare and Medicaid were finally
passed, the legislation included provisions stipulating that the federal government
must pay “hospitals on the basis of what their services cost, and doctors their
reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees.”67 It turns out, this payment scheme,
while providing a consistent payment standard, also served as the catalyst for the
creation of the first major national health care standard, thereby altering health care
provision forever.68 This standard-of-care permitted American jurisprudence to
begin considering medical malpractice suits throughout the nation;69 it motivated

dealing with physicians’ services, medical supplies, ambulance services, and other tests such
as x-rays and lab tests. Id. at 73.
63

See MILLER, supra note 62, at 73.

64

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 52.

65

See Id.

66

See Id. In order to build enough support, Johnson had to make various concessions,
including one that would come back to haunt the nation. Id. at 51. In order to persuade the
American Hospital Association and some insurance providers to support his idea he
acquiesced to a provision that stipulated hospitals would be paid their “reasonable costs” of
providing health care to the elderly. Id. Furthermore, the legislation would also involve
amending the Kerr-Mills program thereby creating what is known as Medicaid. Id. But again,
Johnson had to include a provision which would also come back to haunt the federal
government. Id. This time, the legislation was amended to appease the American Medical
Association. Id. The provision stipulated that physicians fees would be paid for by the
program when they “were ‘reasonable,’ ‘customary,’ and in line with those ‘prevailing’ in
their community.” Id.
67
See Id. At the time congressman and senators rebuked doctors’ arguments that this was
poor legislation by stating, “you’re free of government interference, even on your fees, and a
lot of your nonpaying patients will now be sources of income to you.” Id. See also Interview
with Coleman, supra note 20. Califano’s statement as to a doctor’s ability to “charge
reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees” was referencing Medicare’s impact on the health
care system. CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 51.
68

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 55.

69

See Id. Up through the mid-twentieth century, to avoid a malpractice suite, the physician
needed only to abide by the standard-or-care set forth by the community in which she
practiced. Id.
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physicians to over-treated patients so that they could avoid liability; and it led to a
drastic increase in malpractice-insurance premiums.70
One must remember that Congress was still playing the traditional health care
regulating game—the more doctors and hospitals, the more competition, the more
efficient and less costly the services.71 Unfortunately, “Doctors’ fees rose rapidly
and physicians enriched the treatment of many patients far beyond what was
medically appropriate” because doctors were not being regulated and federal monies
were distributed freely under Medicare through the “reasonable, customary and
prevailing fee standard.”72 While Medicare can take much of the credit for
improving America’s health—extending the life span and improving the quality of
life for the senior citizen, and drastically improving the health care for the poor—an
unwanted effect did result and involved the cost-based, fee-for-service
reimbursement system.73 According to author Michael Millenson: “[Medicare]
became a blank-check for American hospitals and doctors, and they didn’t hesitate to
draw on the account.” Although physicians earnings in 1965 were already five times
the median average income, the rate of increase in their fees promptly doubled.”74
The advent of Medicare is yet another illustration of federal regulation designed
to solve short-term dilemmas leading to negative long-term results. Medicare,
although nobly providing health care for the elderly and the indigent, created a
system that invited massive fraud, thereby drastically increasing health care

70

See Id. The establishment of national standards created a form of liability imposed on
physicians and hospitals when they failed to reasonably conduct every possible test in treating
the patient. Id. As a result, if a hospital’s or a physician’s behavior failed to meet the
stringent national standard, they would be found negligent and often, the jury would award
large monetary damages as compensation. Id. In 1984, doctors were paying approximately $2
billion dollars in malpractice insurance and hospitals were paying around $1.5 billion in
payments. Id.
71
See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 53. Immediately following the passage of Medicare,
Congress pushed through a number of bills to train more doctors and nurses and build more
hospitals. Id. See also supra p. 9 and note 60. Remember, the Hill-Burton Act and the
amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act were drafted with the belief
that the health care industry operated via traditional economic rules. See CALIFANO JR., supra
note 38, at 53.
72
See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 55. See also supra p. 5 and note 31. See generally
MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 163-166. “In 1974, a House subcommittee held the first hearing
on inappropriate surgery and concluded that the number of unneeded procedures had grown
about 20 percent.” (since 1966) Id. at 166. See generally It’s Time to Operate, FORTUNE, Jan.
1970.
73

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 55.

74

See Id. See also MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 163. “Despite doctors’ denunciations of
“socialized medicine, “ the new system encouraged profit maximization. Before Medicare,
many doctors essentially conducted their business according to the principles of Karl Marx,
the father of communism: ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his
needs.’ Physicians charged higher fees to patients who could afford to pay and smaller to
those who could not. Medicare, though, promised to pay whatever fee was ‘usual.’ The
penniless senior citizen was instantly upgraded from charity case to full-fare customer. Id
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premiums.75 In sum, Medicare, the Hill-Burton Act, and the amendments to the
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act, all evidence good-faith, blanketregulation. In the short term, the legislation provided glimpses of a quality health
care system. But in the long term it hindered the nation’s ability to offer its citizens
quality health care at affordable prices.76 The evolution of Medicare, however, did
not signal the conclusion of this trend. It continued when Congress passed the
Employee Retirement Income Securities Act in 1974.77
D. The Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 197478
The Employment Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA) was
principally designed to protect employees participating in their employer’s pension
plans.79 ERISA also induced employers to self-insure their health benefits by
securing the services of a health benefits administrator to fulfill the requisite
administrative responsibilities while financing the benefits program.80 Just as
President Johnson acquiesced to doctors and hospitals to obtain support for
Medicare,81 legislators yielded to powerful employer-funded lobbying groups to
obtain support for the passage of the act.82 In an attempt to convince employers to

75

See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS NOTES
QUESTIONS 261-266 (1988) (discusses fraudulent activity related to Medicare and
Medicaid and specifically concentrates on United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir.
1985)). See generally MILLER, supra note 62, at 66-69 (explains that those who are involved
in providing services and supplies for Medicare and Medicaid patients are subject to anti-fraud
and abuse requirements under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b and are often litigated in cases such as
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989)); accord United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d
68 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); see also United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d
1447 (9th Cir. 1985); but see United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979).
AND

76

See infra note 25.

77

See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 171. See also MILLER, supra note 62, at 85. “ERISA
applies to self-funded employer benefit plans. ERISA is designed to permit employers to offer
uniform benefits nationwide. It preempts nearly all state regulation of such plans, so that
ERISA-qualified plans are protected from most state law challenges to denial of payment.” Id.
There are three levels to any preemption analysis: “(1) all state laws that ‘relate to’ any
covered employee benefit plan are preempted; (2) there is an exception so that state laws that
‘regulate insurance, banking, or securities’ are not preempted; (3) most employee-benefit
plans cannot be deemed to be insurers or banks, so they cannot be subjected to state insurance
or banking laws.” Id. See also Id. at 252. (ERISA regulates most pension and benefit plans
for employees—pension, profit sharing, bonus, medical benefits, disability, death benefits, and
unemployment, among others). Id.
78
See Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
79
See generally David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 443-45 (1987) (the author lists a number of
instances which demonstrate why Congress felt it necessary to pass such an act).
80

See HAVIGHURST, supra note 75, at 1196.

81

See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 52.

82

See Telephone interview with Eubanks, supra note 25.
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provide health benefits, legislators drafted and passed a new preemption clause that
regulates employee-benefit plans and preempts state law applicable to them. Dave
Eubanks, the manager of benefits administration for a large multi-national
corporation, maintains that Congress said to large employers, if you assume more
responsibility for your employees’ welfare plans, this provision will, in effect,
protect you from chaotic and inconsistent state standards as well as juries who are
ready and willing to award large monetary judgments to the plaintiff employees.83
Clark Havighurst, professor of law at Duke University, wrote in HEALTH CARE LAW
AND POLICY:
The purpose of ERISA’s preemptive clause was to give large national
employers, newly subject to federal regulation of their retirement and
welfare benefits plans, some assurance that they would face uniform
requirements. With respect to employee health benefits, however, ERISA
substitutes little federal regulation for the state regulation it preempts, thus
tempting employers to self-insure as a way of escaping regulatory
requirements.84
While the preemption clause did nothing to curb self-insured employers from
avoiding regulation it did, however, permit the self-insured employer to prepare for
one uniform regulatory system. The preemption clause effectively shielded selfinsured employers from state regulation in that ERISA preempted or superceded any
state regulation.
Because the preemptive clause impedes citizens, like Mrs. Garvey’s family, from
bringing a state action for negligence, it has become one of the most contentious
health care issues existing in the debate over patient’s bill of rights legislation.85 In
the short term, the drafting of the clause seemed to be an appropriate measure to
extend health care coverage to more employees. In the long term, however, the
clause has legitimately become the subject of much anger, litigation, and confusion
as to the rights of patients against self-insured employers’ and HMOs’ negligent
behavior. Attorneys Robert Charrow and Lisa Greenlees argue that while
preemption was thought to be the key to affording quality health benefits to
employees, many patient advocates now view the provision as the third-party payor’s
shield against malpractice actions.86
Admittedly, the Hill-Burton Act, the amendments to the Health Professions
Educational Assistance Act, Medicare, and ERISA have helped create one of the
most technologically advanced health care systems in the world. Nevertheless, with
the passage of time, it has become equally apparent that this legislative behavior
lacked foresight in that it created long-term adverse effects—large antiquated
hospital facilities, higher health care costs, more expensive specialists, increased
premiums, mass physician and hospital fraud, wildly expensive malpractice

83

See Id.

84

See HAVIGHURST, supra note 75, at 1197.

85

See Id.

86

See Robert P. Charrow & Lisa T. Greenlees, ERISA Pre-Emption—A Law in Search of a
Doctrine, 27 HEALTH L. DIG. 3, 3 (Mar. 1999).
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insurance, over-prescribed medications, and unjust liability shields for third-party
payors, among many others.87
Selective analysis of past federal regulation of health care illustrates that the
federal government has, unfortunately, sacrificed long term stability for short term
solutions.88 Congress has been unwilling to say “no” to the American public’s
unrealistic desires for more care and better care . . . for less money,89 while
simultaneously acquiescing, first, to large employers and managed care
organizations, who claim that only through a free-market system will the cost of
health care be controlled;90 and, second, to employer, doctor, and hospital-lobbying
groups who are concerned principally with profit margins, checking accounts, and
dividend payments.91 Congress’s desire to “have it all” has led to the current health
care crisis. Understanding that past federal efforts to reform health care, although
instrumental in building our quality health care system, have not produced fairy tale
outcomes, current members of Congress and the legal community should summon
the objectivity necessary for fruitful deliberation on the fate of the preemption
provision. This article further argues that another key to wisely deliberating on the
fate of the preemption clause is to arrive at a substantive legal understanding of the
clause’s ability to preclude state law from interfering with the relationship between
self-insured employers, HMOs, and their employee/patients.
III. AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ERISA WHICH
WOULD ALLOW PATIENTS TO SUE EMPLOYERS AND HMOS FOR MALPRACTICE
UNDER STATE LAW
From 1974 to the late 1980s, the health care market was dominated by fee-forservice plans that were not covered by ERISA.92 As a result, the clause’s chilling
effect on a patient’s ability to sue for punitive damages went untested and unnoticed.
Not until HMOs and other managed care entities became more involved in healthbenefits distribution in the mid-to-late 1980s, did Congress and the legal community
begin to comprehend the clause’s adverse repercussions on the health care system.
Legislative intent behind ERISA is one of many heavily debated issues surrounding
the clause because, in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Pilot Life Insurance
87

See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20.

88

See generally Michael M. Weinstein, In Health Care, Be Careful What You Wish For,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1998, at D3. (the author discusses the fact that accountability clashes
with choice. While the patient wants accountability within the health care system she also
wants the ability to choose any provider she pleases.). See generally Albert R. Hunt, Health
Care Is Issue of the Decade: Anger with System Fuels Pressure for ‘Patient’s Bill of Rights’,
WALL STREET J., June 25, 1998, at A9 (Americans want what is not possible—better care,
quality care, for less money).
89

See David S. Broder, Patients’ Rights: No Pain, No Gain, WASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at

A21.
90

See supra notes 64-79.

91

See HAVIGHURST supra note 75, at 1196.

92

See Charrow & Greenless, supra note 86, at 7. Fee-for-service plans are considered
different than the third-party structure that finds protection from liability in ERISA’s broad
umbrella of preemption. Id.
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Company reasoned that Congress’s legislative intent is the key to interpreting ERISA
and its preemptive affect on state law actions.93 Whereas, third-party payors argue
Congress drafted the clause to protect third-party payors from inconsistent and
expensive state law actions; therefore, Congress should not waiver from its original
purpose and leave the federal preemption clause intact. Consumer advocates argue
that times have changed. While Congress intended ERISA to protect America’s
employers through the preemption clause’s effect on state actions, the clause is now
used to protect third-party payors. Another controversial issue is how the lower
federal courts’ are interpreting the clause’s language. To enable Congress and the
legal community to find common ground on the fate of the preemption clause, this
section briefly explores the nature of preemption, the clause itself, and whether thirdparty payors that conduct prospective-utilization reviews, similar to the one
conducted by Barbara Garvey’s HMO, can be held legally liable under state law.94
Section A analyzes the language of the clause and discusses the legislative intent
supporting the drafting of the ERISA preemption clause and offers three arguments,
each taking a different slant on Congress’s thought process in including the
preemption clause. Section B reviews the federal courts’ interpretations of the clause
and its application to a patient’s state law claim, highlighting the difficulty in
balancing the rights of plan participants and the express language of the preemption
clause by looking at the effects of the federal court rulings on the liability of four
different entities—employers, plan administrators, managed care entities, and
utilization review agents. Section C offers pro and con arguments on the elimination
of the clause and specifically addresses the impact that the rescission would have on
health care premiums, uninsured Americans, and the patient’s ability to obtain legal
redress through state law claims. Finally, Section D discusses the relationship
between the preemption provision and four entities—the patient, the provider, the
self-insured employer, and managed care entities.
A. Legislative Intent Behind the ERISA Preemption Clause
Preemption is a byproduct of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
which provides that federal law supercedes state laws that interfere with, or are
contrary to federal law.95 In 1974, Congress drafted a broad preemption provision

93

See Pilot Life Ins. Co. 481 U.S. 41, 41 (1987).

94

See Adrienne M. Zibelman, The Practice Standard of Care and Liability of Managed
Care Plans, 27 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 204, 208 (1994) (citing Susan M.C. Payne, Identifying
and Managing Inappropriate Hospital Utilization: A Policy Synthesis, 22 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 709 (1987)). “Utilization review (UR) evaluates the patient’s medical record in light of
predefined treatment criteria or expert opinion. UR is implemented primarily in three forms:
[(1)] preadmission review [; (2)] concurrent review[;] and [(3)] retrospective review.” Id. The
pre-admission review is conducted by a registered nurse, who examines the patient’s record as
well as what the insurer’s preferred treatment would be for the specific diagnosis. Id. The
preadmission takes this information and determines what exactly should be done with the
patient—hospitalization, testing, non-staff physician treatment, among others. Id. Concurrent
review makes sure the treatment does not “exceed the limits of profitability.” Id.
“Retrospective review identifies costly patterns of treatment by physicians, diagnosis, or unit,
and takes corrective action to prevent future losses.” Id.
95
Hillsborough County Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985)
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824)). See also U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2. “This
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into ERISA that was broken into three components—the preemption clause, the
savings clause, and the deemer clause.96 The preemption clause enables federal
law—ERISA—“[to] supercede any and all State claims” if the claims “relate to any
employee-benefit plan.”97 The remaining two clauses—savings and deemer—deny
the insurance, banking, and securities industries the opportunity to escape liability
created by state law actions and clarify the effect of the savings clause by specifying
that federal law does not supercede state law actions in cases dealing with insurance
companies, other insurers, banks, trust companies, and investment companies.98 In
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id.
96

See Robert Roth, The Effect of ERISA Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers,
Insurers, Health Plan Administrators, Managed Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents,
7 HEALTH LAWYER 7, 8 (1994-95). See also Pittman, supra note 8, at 355, 356. Some
members of Congress and employers sought to escape the very-real possibility of inconsistent
judgments and standards created in state courts all over the nation and demanded the presence
of a preemption clause. Id. The clause is codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 1988.
Id. at 375, n. 124. The clause provides, “ (e)xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 1003(a).” § 1144(a). According to the author, a “saving clause” was drafted into
the legislation so as to exempt state insurance laws from the ERISA umbrella of preemption.
See Pittman, supra note 8, at 375, n. 125. It reads, “‘nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance.’” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). See Pittman, supra note 8, at 375, n. 125.
This clause was consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)). Id. It states, ‘“the business of
insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to regulation or taxation of such business.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)
(1988). “The application of state statutes and common law regulating insurance is limited by
the ‘deemer clause’ which provides that ‘(n)either an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . .
or to be engaged in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts.’” Pittman, supra note 8,
at 375 n.125 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988)). The preemption clause has been
successfully used to defend against employee’s claim for their personal injuries. Pittman,
supra 8, at 376.
97

See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998) The section states: “Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, the provision of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a). . . .” Id.
98
See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1998). The clause states, “[e]xcept as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” Id. See
also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1998). This provision of the clause states, “[n]either an
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title . . . ., nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed
to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company.”
Id.
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the aggregate, the preemption provision commands that federal law supercede state
actions if the actions “relate to any employee benefit plan,”99 and, furthermore,
provides that insurance companies, banks, trust companies, and investment
companies are not to be construed as employee-benefit plans.100 The federal court’s
interpretation of the preemption-clause language—“relate to”—has been
instrumental in dictating how broad, or how narrow, the federal courts apply the
preemption clause to state law actions. As mentioned above, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that Congress’s intent, or purpose for drafting ERISA is crucial to
interpreting the language, “relate to,” and central to the fate of the preemption
clause.101
Arguably, Congress adopted ERISA to protect members of pension plans and
health-benefit plans. ERISA sets forth, “‘standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.’”102 Today, Congress’s
original intent for the scope of ERISA and its preemption clause is vigorously
debated by lawyers, physicians, self-insured employers, and the courts.103 Thirdparty payor lobbyists argue ERISA regulates pension plans and health plans
sponsored by third-party payors, such as self-insured employers, who provide their
employees with medical, surgical, or hospital care with a “‘purchase of insurance or
otherwise.’”104 Whereas consumer advocates argue that ERISA was created on
behalf of employees.
Was ERISA passed solely for the protection of pension participants? If so, why
did Congress include the preemption clause, thereby depriving patients, “who are
injured by the negligent actions and decisions of ERISA-regulated managed care
organizations [and self-insured employers], the right to hold these plans accountable
for their actions[?]”105
Patient advocates argue that ERISA was created to protect the interests of
employees and their dependents; therefore, the preemption clause should not be
deemed to preclude patients from holding third-party payors liable for their negligent
decisions.106 They posit that Congress wanted to protect pension participants and cite
the ERISA legislative record for support.107 For example, in 1974, Senator Biaggi,

99

See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998).

100

See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1998).

101

See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).

102

See Roth, supra note 96, at 7-8 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)).

103

See Pittman, supra note 8, at 358-59.

104

See Roth, supra note 96, at 7 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).

105

See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ERISA Managed Care Organizations
Should Be Held Accountable for Decisions That Harm Patients, (visited Mar. 3, 1999)
<http://www.apa.org/practice/erisa.html>.
106

See Id. See also Pittman, supra note 8, at 360. See generally Marilyn Klinger & James
P. Diwik, ERISA Preemption and the Surety, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 111, 112-13 (1993).
107

See Pittman, supra note 8, at 360.
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celebrating the passage of the legislation, stated that ERISA was the “emancipation
proclamation of workers.”108
Third-party payors argue that although the interests of employees and their
dependents was central to the legislation, Congress also wanted to make sure selfinsured employers could economically live with the legislation.109 In 1974, Senator
Williams stated,
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute
are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating
the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest
sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.110
As Dave Eubanks maintains, Congress desired to create legislation that was not
too onerous on the employer—e.g., Congress did not want to force employers to
prepare for fifty different sets of regulations.111 Even more, Congress wanted to

108

See 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 193 (1974) (statement of Sen. Biaggi). “The benefits of this
legislation for some 70 million working men and women will be far reaching and profound.
Workers are receiving their own version of an emancipation proclamation. The Pension
Reform Act will save the American worker from economic anxiety and uncertainty which in
the past has accompanied retirement. It will free workers from servitude to unscrupulous
employers, who seek to deprive their employees of the fundamental right to a pension.” Id.
See also 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 197 (1974) (statement by Sen. Javits) (he likened the importance
of ERISA to that of the development of Social Security, “[ERISA is the] greatest development
in the life of the American worker since social security.” Id.
109
See 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent). Dent felt that the
preemption was the “crowning achievement” of the entire ERISA legislation. That it actually
protects pension participants by eliminating any possibility “of conflicting and inconsistent
state and local regulations” which could “affect any employee benefit plan” governed by
ERISA. Id.
110

See e.g. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec.
29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. William)).
111
See Telephone interview with Eubanks, supra note 25. Mr. Eubanks argues self-insured
employers regulated by ERISA were, and are, concerned with the unfortunate, but true
arbitrary nature of state courts. Id. They realize that state courts have judges whose election
campaigns may be funded partially by plaintiffs lawyers; therefore, the judges might be biased
against the multi-state companies. Id. See also Interview with Coleman, supra note 20.
Furthermore, certain regions of the country are very protective of their own sons and
daughters. Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. Therefore, a jury may be emotionally
swayed to rule for their own son or daughter rather than the large, impersonal, but possibly,
not guilty self-insured employer. Id. If the federal preemption was placed in the ERISA
legislation, the liability resulting from arbitrary factors could lead to unjust legal decisions,
thereby making an employers ability to provide health benefits an uneconomical decision. Id.
See also, Charrow & Greenlees, supra note 86, at 3. Congress passed ERISA to create
uniformity in the enforcement of employee benefits. Id.
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provide the employer with the sanctity of the federal courts, where the damages
awarded would be limited by the provisions laid out within ERISA.112
An increasing number of individuals—consumer advocates and physician
providers, among others—rebuff third-party payor claims by reasoning that
legislative intent is irrelevant.113 They claim that “ERISA’s preemption language is
generating litigation that was never anticipated when the statute passed two decades
ago, and therefore the preemption lawsuits contravene ERISA’s original purpose—
the protection of participants in employee benefit plans.”114 More importantly, they
argue that the influx of prospective utilization review procedures—evaluation of a
patient’s medical record in light of predefined treatment criteria or expert opinion115
—has altered the health care landscape so much that the preemption clause’s adverse
effect on a patient’s ability to seek legal redress was totally unforeseen by Congress
in 1974.116 Therefore, legislative intent is irrelevant and ERISA must be changed
because it is unfair or unjust to deny a harmed patient any sort of compensation
beyond that provided for in ERISA.117
112
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52. The Court outlines three provisions within ERISA
that serve as the enforcement mechanism for the legislation. Id. They are: (1) 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132 provides civil enforcement mechanisms for a variety of issues; (2) 29 U.S.C. § 1131
provides criminal penalties for violations of the disclosure and reporting provisions of ERISA;
and (3) 29 U.S.C. § 1133 provides that notice must be given to the beneficiary or the plan
participant for any claims denied and a reasonable review is offered on that decision to deny.
Id. at 53. See also Roth, supra note 96, at 8. The civil action component, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a), permits, in relative part, that a civil action may be brought by a participant or
beneficiary for compensation for plan benefits, injunctions against refusals by plans to pay
benefits, and attorney fees. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52. The Court in Pilot Life felt
these three prongs of enforcement provided for a “careful balancing of the need for prompt
and fair claims settlement procedures against public interest in encouraging the formation of
employee-benefit plans. Id. The Court further felt that the precise inclusion of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a) demonstrates that Congress did not intend to permit other remedies not included in
the provision. Id. See also AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 15 (details a
list of courts who have urged Congress to amend ERISA).
113

See Robin Elizabeth Margolis, Is ERISA Preemption the Health Insurance ‘Wrecking
Ball?,’ 10 HEALTHSPAN 24 (Feb. 1993).
114

See Id.

115

See Zibelman, supra note 94, at 208.

116

See Pittman, supra note 8, at 361. Up until the early 1980s, medical treatment was paid
for retroactively. Id. Meaning, “physicians and hospitals submitted bills and received
payments from the government, or from private insurance companies, after the medical
treatment had already been received by the patient.” Id. Unfortunately, the retroactive system
was not able to control the costs of health care because “the propriety of the treatment is
considered after the treatment has been rendered and the cost of the care incurred.” Id.
Because the Hill-Burton Act created a huge health care infrastructure to support, the
amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act created too many doctors,
and Medicare created a system which permitted incredible abuse. The cost of health care
increased from 5% of the Gross National Product to 11% between 1960 and 1983, and then to
11.6% of the GNP in 1989. Id.
117

See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 105. See also Pittman, supra
note 8, at 362. As a result, the federal government, private employers, and insurance
companies created the utilization review mechanism as a vehicle to eliminate excess and
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Legislative intent behind ERISA is one of many factors that Congress and the
legal community might take into consideration when deliberating on the fate of the
preemption clause. As the third-group of advocates question above, should it be? If
the health care landscape has changed so much since the drafting of the preemption
clause, should not Congress re-evaluate the relationship between third-party payors,
their patients, and state law actions and leave legislative intent for the history books?
The lower federal courts think so. The following section briefly examines the
federal courts’ analysis of the clause, its effect on a patient’s state law actions, and
how courts’ analysis could serve as a catalyst for deliberation on the fate of the
preemption clause.
B. The Federal Courts’ Treatment of the ERISA Preemption Provision
If legislative intent is irrelevant, Congress’s willingness to steer clear from its
legacy of legislating long-term adverse impacts on the health care delivery system
may lie in its ability to understand federal courts’ interpretation of the clause and
their effect on state law. As this section demonstrates, federal courts struggle with
the language of the preemption clause and its impact on patients who are precluded
from protecting themselves and others by using state law actions. This section
explores the federal courts’ analysis of the clause, and explores both tort actions
against third-party payors and the difficulty federal courts are having balancing the
rights of the patient with the express language of the clause. This section maintains
that the discussion in our nation’s federal court rooms can serve as background
information for Congress as they currently deliberate on the fate of the preemption
clause.
When determining the ERISA preemption clause’s scope and reach, the federal
courts generally conduct a two-part analysis. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that because ERISA contains express civil remedies
within the statute, federal law preempts any state common law tort and contract
causes-of-action asserting improper processing of claim for benefits under an insured
employee’s benefit plan.118 The Court reasoned that if it would allow state tort
actions against ERISA regulated plans, its decision would undermine an expressed
provision set forth by Congress that already covers remedies.119 The Court stated
that the first step in determining whether a certain state action, such as a negligent
claim against a self-insured employer, is preempted by the preemption clause is to
analyze legislative intent.120 Following a review of the Congressional record, the
Court, in Pilot Life, determined that the preemption clause was drafted to be
deliberately expansive, that it was designed to “‘establish pension-plan regulation

useless medical treatments and expenses. Pittman, supra note 8, at 362. While these review
procedures are used to cut “the excess fat” from the health care industry, their is a real fear
that self-insured employers and benefits managers will use the prospective utilization review
to deny necessary medical treatments in the name of cost efficiency. Id. at 363. Furthermore,
as long as the denial was made according to plan specifications, ERISA preempts any and all
state claims. Id. at 364.
118

See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).

119

Id. See also Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998).

120

Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 44-45.
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[and employee-benefit plan regulation] as exclusively a federal concern.’”121 The
Court came to this conclusion only after it discovered that the original draft of
ERISA—which contained a too narrowly tailored preemption clause—had been
rejected by Congress in favor of the present broadly-drafted version which affords
third-party payors more protection state law liability.122
The second part, also expressed in Pilot Life, requires federal courts to apply the
U.S. Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of this provision to the phrase ‘relates
to’ as set forth in the preemption clause.123 In Bast v. Prudential Insurance Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to follow precedent
and held that “a state law cause of action is [only] preempted by ERISA if it ‘relates
to’ an employee-benefits plan.”124 According to the court in Bast, since 1983, federal
courts have interpreted state law relating to an employee-benefits plan, “‘if it has a
connection with or reference to such plan.’”125
The United States Supreme Court was subsequently called upon to define what
exactly “relate to” meant. The Court, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,126 held that “[courts] must go beyond
the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term [relate to],
and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the
state law that Congress understood would survive.”127 In District of Columbia v.
Greater Washington Board of Trade, the Court added that the existence of the
“connection with or reference to employee-benefit plans” is to be established by
examining the “objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state
law that Congress understood would survive, as well as the nature of the effect of the
state law on ERISA [health] plans.”128 For example, if Mrs. Garvey’s family had
121

See Id. at 46 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).

122

See Id. at 46. “The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption
clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA. The
Conference Committee rejected those provisions in favor of the present language, and
indicated that section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.” Id. (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1090, at 383, (1974); see also Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98, (1983).
123

See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47.

124

See Id. See also Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)); see, e.g. Corporate
Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Metroplex
Infusion Care, Inc. v. Lone Star Container Corp., 855 F. Supp. 897, 900 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
125
Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139
(1990) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Ind., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
126

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
127

See Id. at 656. See also Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ
Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1998) (“of late, the [Supreme] Court has come to
recognize that ERISA pre-emption must have limits when it enters areas traditionally left to
state regulation . . .”).
128
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992). See also
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
317 (1997).
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decided that the remedies provided for under ERISA were inadequate,129 and sued
the HMO in state court for negligently denying Mrs. Garvey a bone-marrow
transplant in Hawaii, the HMO would likely have argued that Mrs. Garvey’s state
law claim was preempted by ERISA because Congress’s objective was to protect
self-insured employers. The federal court would have to follow precedent and look
to the legislative intent supporting the preemption clause to evaluate if the denial of a
bone-marrow transplant was “related to” or “connected to” the administration of the
employee-benefit plan.130 As long as the third-party payor’s decision was based on
an objective application of the benefit-plan restrictions and not a subjective medical
decision, more likely than not, the federal court would deem that denying a bonemarrow transplant was “related to” the administration of an employee benefit plan
and, therefore, that the state law claim was preempted by ERISA.
Attempting to provide clarity to ambiguous language in the 1974 ERISA act, the
U.S. Supreme Court provided the basic outline for the controversial preemption
analysis. The preemption clause’s effect on state law, however, becomes most
controversial when, similar to the Garvey incident, the denial of a patient’s state law
claim against self-insured employers and other third-party payor entities results in
death. This section will begin by providing an overview of the federal courts’
analysis of the preemption clause’s effect on tort claims between self-insured
employers and their plan participants. Part two of this section will conclude by
outlining the general difficulty that many federal courts are having with the
preemption clause’s effect on a patient’s ability to sue, specifically, self-insured
employers, plan administrators, managed care entities, and utilization review agents.
1. Tort Claims Between Self-Insured Employers And Their Health Care Plan
Participants
As mentioned earlier, in Pilot Life Insurance Co.,131 the Court held that because
ERISA contains express civil remedies within the statute, federal law preempts any
state common law tort and contract cause-of-action asserting negligent processing of
claim for benefits under an insured employee’s benefit plan.132 The Court held that if
it would allow state tort actions against ERISA-regulated plans, its decision would
render moot an expressed provision set forth by Congress.133 Since Pilot Life, courts
have expanded the Court’s ruling to apply to other state tort actions.134 In Bast, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that causes of action for
“breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
infliction of emotional distress”,135 and wrongful death based on a third-party payor’s
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See 29 U.S.C. § 1131; 29 U.S.C. § 1132; 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
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Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).

131

See Id.

132

See Id.

133

See Id. see also Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998).

134

See Roth, supra note 96, at 8.

135

See Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007-08.
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negligent administration of a claim, were preempted.136 Furthermore, and of great
import to the Mrs. Garveys of the world, according to the Supreme Court, in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, extra-contractual,
compensatory, and punitive damages are also not permitted under ERISA.137
Patients, politicians, and providers are understandably troubled by ERISA
depriving a plaintiff of substantive state law remedies for alleged negligent actions
by the self-insured employer’s plan administrator, among others.138 In the past,
national issues such as abortion, civil rights, gender equality were handled within the
federal court system. The public has, therefore, come to expect the federal courts to
provide guidance when struggling with the many systemic problems that plague our
nation. With respect to the preemption’s adverse impact on patients’ rights, the
federal courts, despite minor deviations, refuse to bend and continue to stand
steadfast in their interpretation of the preemption clause. In Cannon v. Group Health
Services, a woman was diagnosed with leukemia and needed a bone-marrow
transplant.139 Her insurance company denied her request on the basis that the
procedure was experimental.140 Although the insurance company would later reverse
its decision, it was too late, and the woman died shortly thereafter.141 The woman’s
spouse brought an action alleging the insurer negligently or in bad faith refused to
authorize the procedure in a timely manner.142 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit ruled that ERISA preempts state law claims even if there is no
alternative remedy under ERISA.143 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits concurred with the Tenth Circuit when deciding that
ERISA preempts state laws even if that means the plaintiff, or the plaintiff’s
dependents, obtain no remedy.144
136

See Id. See also Tingey v. Pingley-Richards West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992) ;
Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (attorney’s fees awarded because
insurer agreed to pay for medical services only after plaintiff sued to compel coverage, even
though the wrongful death action was preempted by ERISA).
137

Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Sokol v. Bernstein,
803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986) (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) does not permit extra-contractual damages,
including damages for emotional distress).
138

See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 103. Terre McFillen Hall,
executive director of the Center for Patient Advocacy, stated: “If HMOs are making medical
decisions, and in essence that’s what they’re doing . . . then they should be held accountable
just like any doctor who makes medical decisions.” Id. Also, Ronald F. Pollack, executive
director of Families USA, stated, “there’s no question that plans are practicing medicine. What
plans are saying is: ‘We can practice medicine until we make a mistake, then you shouldn’t
treat us as if we’re practicing medicine.’” Id.
139

Cannon v. Group Health Servs. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).

140

See Id.

141

See Id.

142

See Id.

143

See Id.

144

Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) (“while we are not
unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies
within a statute intended to protect participants in employee-benefit plans, . . . the lack of
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In general, the federal courts remain unified in finding that federal law preempts
state law claims if they relate to employee-benefit plans. The courts, however, have
become increasingly troubled with the preemption clause’s chilling effect on harmed
patients and their dependents’ rights to punish the alleged wrongdoers.145 As a result,
some federal courts have begun to explore avenues to evade the preemption clause’s
adverse impact on a patient’s ability to seek state law remedies.
2. The Difficulty In Balancing The Rights Of Plan Participants With The Express
Language Of The Preemption Clause
In the United States Court of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, although proscribing federal preemption over state law claims, courts have
expressed a sense of remorse in having to deny injured or deceased plaintiffs any
recourse other than that provided for under ERISA.146 The federal courts,
nevertheless, maintain that if injustices are being committed as a result of federal law
preempting state law, the judicial branch has no business interjecting its sense of
justice into policy decisions.147 They further maintain that policy discussions should
not take place in the courtroom; rather, the Constitution stipulates that it is the
responsibility of the people through their elected representatives in Congress.148 For
example, the Fifth Circuit, in Corcoran v. United Healthcare, stated,
the result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans . . . have
no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake . . .
Fundamental changes such as widespread institution of utilization review
would seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to

ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis.”); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48
F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) (that ERISA does not provide the full range of remedies
available under state law in no way undermines ERISA preemption.”); Cromwell v. EquicorEquitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) (nor is it relevant to an analysis of
the scope of federal preemption that appellants may be left without a remedy).
145

See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 103.

146

See Id.

147

See Id.

148

Cannon v, Group Health Servs. Of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).
(“although moved by the tragic circumstances of this case . . . we conclude that the law gives
us no choice but to affirm the dismissal of the case on ERISA preemption grounds . . .
Congress, not this court, is the appropriate forum for policy arguments.”); See AndrewsClarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997) (“tragic events set forth . . . cry
out for relief . . . Nevertheless, this Court had no choice but to [remove the case] out of state
court . . . and then at the behest of the [defendants], to slam the courthouse doors in [their] face
leaving [them] without a remedy. This case . . . becomes another illustration of the glaring
need for Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the modern health
care system . . . ERISA has evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers,
utilization review providers . . . from potential liability for the consequences of their wrongful
denial of health benefits.”); See Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, (9th Cir. 1998)
(“the Bast’s state claims are preempted by ERISA, and ERISA provides no remedy.
Unfortunately, without action by Congress, there is nothing we can do to help the Basts and
others who may find themselves in this same unfortunate situation.”)
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serve its noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees. Our
system, of course, allocates this task to Congress, not the courts.149
While most lower federal courts adhere to the Pilot Life precedent and mirror the
sentiments of the Corcoran court; federal courts have, in some rare instances,
deviated from their strict application of the preemption clause.150
Beginning with Pilot Life, federal courts have held that state laws that have a
connection with or reference to health-benefit plans will be preempted.151 In Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state laws that impact
health-benefit plans in a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” manner are not
preempted.152 Since this decision, the task of determining when and what impact is
“tenuous, remote, or peripheral” has proven difficult to apply to the many fact
patterns that arise involving health plan participants. Within the federal courts,
however, four categories are emerging in which the standard “tenuous, remote, or
peripheral” has been applied and resulted in evasion of federal preemption.153 To
better able Congress and the reader to understand the issue of eliminating the ERISA
preemption clause, this section examines how federal courts balance the affects of
federal preemption with these same four categories: (a) self-insured employers; (b)
administrators; (c ) managed care companies; and, (d) utilization review agents.
a. Liability of Self-Insured Employers
The liability of a self-insured employer in state court is normally preempted by
the preemption clause. The federal courts, nevertheless, have found self-insured
employers liable under two theories—vicarious liability and direct negligence.154
Vicarious liability assumes that the self-insured employer is able to control the
behavior of the physician who cares for their employees.155 Vicarious liability is
difficult to prove and conditional upon the courts’ interpretation of several factors,
among them: whether the self-insured employer serves as a gatekeeper (i.e., an
individual who is to decide on whether a patient’s health care claim will be
reimbursed by the self-insured employer); whether doctors are compensated through
capitation (i.e., a system of pre-payment to physicians to care for an employee’s
health); and, whether third-party payors actively evaluate the quality of care
provided within their plans.156 For example, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit ruled, in Cooney v. South Central Bell Telephone, that an employee’s
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Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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See Roth, supra note 96, at 8.
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See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, U.S. 41, 41 (1987).
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See Id.
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See Roth, supra note 96, at 8.
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See Charrow & Greenlees, supra note 86, at 4.
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See Id. at 5.
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See Id. See generally Vicki L. MacDougall, The “Shared Risk” of Potential Tort
Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations and the Defense of ERISA Preemption, 32 Val.
U. L. Rev. 855 (1998).
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state law claim of negligence and intentional tort was not preempted.157 The court
maintained that the self-insured employer’s disregard for the employee’s doctors
advice and subsequent mandate that the employee return to work was not “related
to,” but rather “tenuously, remotely, or peripherally” related to, the health benefit
plans covered by ERISA.158
Federal courts also look to direct negligence if the plaintiff-employee can
demonstrate that the self-insured employer “negligently supervised or negligently
selected” a doctor to be included in its benefits network.159 Federal courts maintain
that the negligent selection of a physician to be included in the self-insured
employer’s health-benefit plan network is not “related to” the administration of a
health-benefit plan, but rather tenuously, peripherally, or remotely connected.160
b. The Liability of a Plan Administrator
As is the case with the liability of self-insured employers, the liability of a plan
administrator in state court is almost always preempted by ERISA.161 Exceptions to
the rule occurred in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.162
In Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Equicor Inc., the Eleventh Circuit stated that
ERISA did not preempt a state claim for negligent misrepresentation of insurance
coverage against a plan administrator.163 The court argued that the state law action
was not preempted for two reasons. First, preemption was not part of Congress’
purpose for ERISA, rather it was designed to protect the interests of the employee
covered by benefits.164 Therefore, preemption of a patient’s claim against a thirdparty provider would defeat rather than promote this goal.165 Second, the court
argued that health care providers were not foreseen as parties to the ERISA
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Cooney v. South Cent. Bell Tel., 998 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Perry v. P.I.E.
Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1989) (ERISA did not preempt an employee’s claim
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See Roth, supra note 96, at 8. See Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 129 (9th
Cir. 1993).
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See Lordmann Enters., Inc. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1994); See also
Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752 (10th Cir.
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Z15. The article discussed a similar cause of action which could escape preemption. Id. If a
third-party payor contracts with a doctor who has a past history of malpractice and then harms
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164

See Lordmann Enters., Inc., 32 F.3d at 1533.
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bargain.166 The court reasoned that while ERISA provided federal causes of action
for employers and employees, it did not “provide a cause of action for aggrieved
health care providers that treat ERISA participants.”167
c. Liability of Managed Care Entities
The overwhelming majority of cases that involve a patient’s state law claim
against third-party payors—self-insured employers and managed care entities—are
preempted by ERISA. The federal courts treat managed care entities the same as
self-insured employers for purposes of preemption analysis.168 Federal courts,
nevertheless, have, at times, found managed care entities liable for state actions
under vicarious liability.169 But vicarious liability has turned out to be tenuous at
best in providing avenues to evade the preemption clause’s grip over state law
claims.
In Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a state tort claim of vicarious liability for
money damages was not preempted by ERISA because it did not relate to ERISA
and the plaintiff would otherwise be denied adequate relief.170 The court viewed the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service—
“run-of-the mill state law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even
torts committed by an ERISA plan are relatively commonplace” and not preempted
by ERISA—as support for its analysis.171 Independence, however, has been
criticized.172 In Ricci v. Gooberman, M.D., the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey maintained that the court in Independence mistakenly
interpreted the issue of vicarious liability as it pertains to managed care entities.173
The New Jersey District Court argued that vicarious liability claims do relate to
employee-benefit plans and furthermore, that it is inconsistent “to deny preemption
in vicarious liability claims while allowing preemption in regular negligence
claims.”174 The federal courts deeming vicarious liability claims outside the scope of
the ERISA preemption clause is really not a solution. Rather, the only consistent
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See Roth, supra note 96, at 9. See e.g. Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889 (7th Cir.
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preempted); see also Rollo v. Maxicare, 695 F.Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988) (patient’s state law
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tortious interference with physician-patient relationship was preempted because they were
related to an employee benefit plan).
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federal court solution is to encourage Congress to re-visit the broad language of the
clause itself.175
d. Liability of Utilization Review Agents
Utilization review agents are similar to gatekeepers in that they are, often times,
not medical professionals, but rather business persons who are responsible for
deciding whether or not a medical procedure should be reimbursed by the third-party
payor. Unlike the aforementioned categories, state law claims against a utilization
review agent have been consistently found to be preempted by ERISA.
When analyzing the liability of prospective utilization review agents, the federal
courts tend to follow the Fifth Circuit precedent in Corcoran v. United HealthCare,
Inc.,176 which stated that liability of a utilization review agent “arises when a treating
physician believes that a more aggressive-and usually more-costly treatment is
warranted, but the third-party payor does not.”177 Because the U.S. Supreme Court
has not provided a bright-line test with which to evaluate third-party payors’ and
their utilization review agents’ liability under ERISA, the federal courts seem to base
much of their decision-making on whether or not third-party payors are making
medical decisions or “mere determinations regarding processing of benefits when
denying coverage.”178 That is, if the third-party payor is making a medical decision,
the courts may hold that that behavior does not relate to an employee-benefit plan
and is, therefore, not preempted from a state law action.179 If the third-party payor is,
however, making a determination regarding the processing of benefits, the courts
will deem the utilization review agent’s action as being immune from state law
actions.180 Following the Corcoran decision, the Seventh, the Eighth, the Ninth, and
the Tenth Circuits have found suits against the utilization review agent preempted,
because rather than involving medical decisions, the suits were found to pertain to an
issue of “negligent administration of benefit claims.”181
Despite the lower federal courts’ rare deviation, the preemption of state law
claims has emerged largely unscathed as to the federal courts’ interpretation of the
legislative intent supporting ERISA and the expressed language of the broad
preemption clause. As a result, politicians, consumer advocates, and providers are
vociferously calling for Congressional intervention. If one adds pleas for
Congressional reform by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, it seems there is
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a formidable movement afoot to urge Congress to, once again, meddle in the health
care industry by eliminating the preemption clause. This movement could result in
federal legislation that would create a reasonable balance between employee-patients
rights and their third-party payors—self-insured employers and health-management
entities—or exacerbate an already critical health care dilemma. The following
section will explore the pros and cons of such an action.
C. Brief Exploration of the Politically-Charged Discussion Involving the
Elimination of the ERISA Preemption Clause
Throughout the ongoing discussion as to whether Congress should meddle with
health care through a patient’s bill of rights, a consensus has formed among patient
advocates, self-insured employers, politicians, and providers. They argue that the
fate of the preemption clause is the key to the 106th Congress’s deliberation on what
would be the first health care reform bill of the new millenium.182 They point to the
federal judicial system which has spoken loud and clear—holding that the fate of the
preemption clause lies, not within the judicial branch, but, rather, within the
legislative branch.183 For patients, however, wishing to resolve the matter quickly,
both within Congress and throughout the nation, there are two heavily-entrenched
camps that diametrically oppose one another.
One side of this health care battle is chiefly controlled by self-insured employers,
managed care entities, and defense trial attorneys, among others. The opposing side
is spearheaded by physicians, consumer advocates, and plaintiff trial lawyers. The
first coalition—self-insured employers, among others—is strongly opposed to
eliminating the preemption clause. They argue that elimination of the clause will
raise premium costs, limit coverage, reward the trial bar with unnecessarily large
amounts of money, and lead to complex inconsistent systems of interpreting plan
practices.184 Therefore, if Congress is truly concerned with the delivery of quality
health care at an affordable cost, the preemption clause should be left alone.185 The
second coalition—physicians and consumer advocates, among others—argues that
the retention of the current broadly-construed preemption clause continues the trend
of depriving patients, like Mrs. Garvey, the right to punish third-party payors for
negligently disrupting the delivery of quality health care.186 This coalition, in a
resonating voice, argues that third-party payors, who commit negligent acts towards

182
See SOME MANAGED CARE REFORMERS CALL LIABILITY KEY TO BILL, NATIONAL
JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, July 22, 1998. John Dingell, democrat from Michigan, stated,
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their patients, must be held legally liable in state courts.187 They conclude that in a
time of cost-conscious health care provision, only through legal punitive actions in
state court, will the patient be assured quality health care.188
To best understand both perspectives, this section explores three possible
repercussions of the elimination of the preemption clause: a large increase in health
care premiums, a proliferation in the number of uninsured Americans, and an
increase in the number of patient initiated state law claims against third-party payors.
1. Increase in Health Care Premiums
If the preemption clause is eliminated, an increase in health care premiums would
result. The degree of increase, however, is another, more amorphous, issue. The
third-party payor coalition argues that the elimination of the preemption clause will
result in a drastic increase of health care premiums. On the flip side, consumer
advocates maintain that the rise in premiums will be minimal and that this issue is
nothing but a scare tactic used to persuade Congress not to eliminate the preemption
clause.
Employers voluntarily provide health benefits as a means to recruit new
employees and reward existing employees with quality health care.189 The coalition
of third-party payors maintains that if the preemption clause is eliminated, thirdparty payors will be exposed to unlimited financial liability for all coverage
decisions, whether appropriate or inappropriate.190 They argue that the increased
liability costs can only be offset by increasing premiums.
A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study of proposed legislation that would
eliminate the preemption clause found that “health plans and [self-insured
employers] would be sued along with the providers . . . more frequently . . . because
of the plan’s [self-insured employer’s] deep pockets.191 Self-insured employers
187
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188
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AGENCIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 105th Cong. (statement of Olena
Berg, Assistant Secretary, Pension and Welfare Benefit Administrator).
189
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See HEALTH BENEFITS COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE CHOICE AND QUALITY, supra note
184. If Congress eliminates the preemption clause, “employers would be faced with an
endlessly complex problem of discerning appropriate practices that would be acceptable
across different state jurisdictions.” Id. Furthermore, expanded liability will drive the cost of
premiums up and possibly lead to employers dropping their voluntary provision of health
benefits to their employees. Id. “Employers would be forced . . . to reduce benefits, increase
premiums and co-payments or eliminate coverage altogether.” Id. See also Mary Jane Fisher,
Doctors Look to Protect ERISA Exemption; Physician Insurers Association of America Urges
Congress Not to Repeal the Employee Retirement Security Act Preemption, in NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER PROPERTY AND CASUALTY-RISK AND BENEFITS MANAGEMENT 21, at 6, May 25,
1998. See also Letter from Clark Havighurst, William Neel Reynolds Professor of Law at the
Duke University School of Law, to Charles D. Weller of Baker & Hostetler Law Firm (Oct.
21, 1997) (on file with author).
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argue this increased financial liability would require large sums of money to be spent
on defending against the increased number of claims, thereby making it much less
attractive, if not, unbearable, for self-insured employers to continue offering health
benefits to their employees.192 They state that large sums of money spent on
defending lawsuits from what they deem as baseless claims would be offset by
increased premiums charged to plan participants. In addition to the increase in
medical negligence suits, the CBO office estimates that the cost of liability insurance
would also increase dramatically: “every judicial decision awarding damages to a
plaintiff for a plan’s coverage decision would increase the risk of suit for all other
plans with similar coverage policies.”193 The CBO further estimates that the
elimination of the preemption clause could increase liability costs by sixty- to
seventy-five percent.194 Third-party payors argue if their costs of providing health
benefits increase, the cost of health care premiums will rise with it.195 David
Eubanks, the manager of benefits administration of a multinational corporation,
maintains that “if the preemption clause is eliminated, a very complex system made
up of inconsistent state interpretations of plan practices would result. This system
would in effect create a chaotic and expensive regulatory system. One in which,
multi-state employers could not afford to deal with.”196 Their ability to handle the
estimated increased liability costs will be contingent on their ability to raise health
care premiums.
The consumer coalition maintains that third-party payors’ arguments are nothing
but scare tactics, full of exaggerated fear mongering. This coalition proffers an
assortment of counter-arguments, dispelling third-party payors’ contentions on the
bleak status of health care premiums if the preemption clause is eliminated. First,
this coalition argues that there are considerable costs attributed to the fact that
medical negligence is not effectively legally deterred. Jamie Court, director of
Consumers for Quality Care, states, “Reforms that safeguard quality health care will
save millions per year because it costs the health care system $60 billion per year to

16, 1998) <http://www.cbo.gov/ showdoc.cfm?index=667&sequence=o&from=6.htm>. In
addition to the increase in medical negligence suits, the CBO office estimates that liability
insurance would increase dramatically, “every judicial decision awarding damages to a
plaintiff for a plan’s coverage decision would increase the risk of suit for all other plans with
similar coverage policies.” Id.
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care for injuries due to medical negligence according to the Harvard School of Public
Health.”197 Furthermore, according to Patricia M. Danzon, a noted economist:
The malpractice system is costly and imperfect, but these defects are often
exaggerated. The cost of malpractice—the real social cost of injuries
occurring because of medical negligence—is many times greater than the
more visible costs of insurance premiums and wasteful defensive
practices. Therefore in considering reform, the deterrence of malpractice
must be considered at least as important as the cost of malpractice
claims.198
Moreover, assuming third-party payors’ liability costs will increase by “sixty-to
seventy-percent,”199 the CBO conservatively estimates that this increase should only
equate to a 1.4 percent increase in premium costs.200 Furthermore, a report on the
impact of potential changes to ERISA, including elimination of the preemption
clause, by the highly-regarded Kaiser Family Foundation, echoes the CBO’s
sentiments and found that the increase in premiums would be minimal—0.03% to
.011%.201 While the Kaiser Family Foundation admits that these figures could be
conservative, questions must arise about the validity of the third-party payor
coalition’s claim that if the preemption clause is eliminated, we will experience an
8.6% increase in premiums.202
The Kaiser Family Foundation report does dispel some of the fear created by
third-party payors; yet Congress must remember that the foundation’s figures are
197
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admittedly highly conditional. The foundation acknowledges the high level of
uncertainty in determining how exactly the health care market will react to the
introduction of patient initiated state law claims against third-party payors.203
In sum, third-party payors maintain that the elimination of the preemption clause
will cause large increases in premiums and that these increases in premiums could
heavily burden the nation’s health care system. On the other hand, consumer
activists counter by arguing that the fear of increased premiums is unfounded. They
echo Patricia Danzon’s comments in that the cost of deterrence of malpractice is as
important as the deterrence of the cost of malpractice claims.204 While the increase
in premiums argument remains unclear, it should be an important consideration that
Congress takes into account when deciding the fate of the preemption clause.
Congress must decide whether it deems a patient’s right to obtain legal redress in
state court worthy enough to call the possible bluff of the third-party payors—and, if
the third-party payors’ predictions are borne out, whether the federal government is
willing to intervene and ensure that premiums do not rise too high so as to price the
average patient out of the health care market altogether.
2. Proliferation of the Number of Uninsured Americans
If Congress eliminates the preemption clause, there will undoubtedly be an
increase in the costs of providing health benefits.205 In dealing with this increase,
self-insured employers maintain that they have three options—raise premiums,206
provide a lump sum of money every year to the employee rather than administer
health benefits through the company,207 or eliminate health benefits altogether.208
Self-insured employers argue that if premiums increase, unquestionably, some
Americans will forgo the high costs of health care in favor of more immediate needs,
203
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such as housing and food. If self-insured employers decide that the cost of providing
health care is too much to bear, yet still desire to remain in the health care benefits
business, they might simply provide a lump sum each year to individual employees
and encourage the employee to use this money for health insurance. This could
create more uninsured Americans. Third-party payors claim that they fear that many
employees will decline to use the money for health insurance.209 They fear that
rather than care for their own health, they will spend the lump sum on the repayment
of loans or a family vacation.210 Third-party payors also claim to fear that if the
employee takes the money and uses it to purchase her family’s health insurance,
without federal government intervention, she will be at a serious disadvantage in
negotiating the prices and details of a health plan. Not only will she lack the
expertise needed to maneuver through the complicated maze of health care plans she
also will lack the purchasing power of a large plan in negotiating a reasonable price
with providers. If self-insured employers exit the health care business altogether,
this would unequivocally result in an increase in uninsured Americans.
Third-party payors claim that any angle the self-insured employer takes will
result in an increase in the number of uninsured Americans.211 In a recent survey
conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 67% of the country’s employers said
they would be forced to drop health care coverage if Congress renders moot the
preemption clause.212 Furthermore, 81% of employers reported that they would drop
health benefits if the costs increased at all.213 It goes without saying these figures are
frightening. What is even more disturbing is the fact that this country already has
over forty-one million non-elderly, uninsured citizens,214 and over the past decade,
this number has increased by a staggering ten million.215 Even more, at this time,
eight out of ten of the uninsured citizens are full-time workers.216
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When deliberating on the fate of the preemption provision, the possibility of
increasing the number of uninsured Americans is, or, if not, should be, a serious
concern for Congress. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation report, health
care directly relates to health outcomes and the financial well-being of families.217
Even more, “[b]ecause [an uninsured citizen’s] primary health care needs are not
addressed, the uninsured are more likely than those with insurance to be hospitalized
for conditions that could have been avoided.”218
Congress does, however, have choices when dealing with the current number of
uninsured Americans and the disturbing predictions made by the self-insured
employers. Consumer advocates argue universal care, a form of socialized medicine
made famous by President Clinton’s 1992 health care initiative, would ensure that all
Americans would receive basic health care. Uwe Reinhardt, James Madison
professor of political economy at Princeton University, points out, Congress must
look at universal care as a “real choice . . . between a government-run program that
treats health care as an entitlement and a more conservative approach that treats
health care as a private consumption good in which the rich are better off than the
poor.”219 Consumer advocates argue that if the nation is truly fearful of a drastic
increase in the number of uninsured Americans, their concern should not punish
patients by depriving them of their ability to hold third-party payors accountable;
rather, their fear should fuel the debate supporting the need for universal care in this
country.
3. Inflation in the Number of Patient Initiated State Law Claims Against Third-Party
Payors
The third possible repercussion from the elimination of the preemption clause,
indirectly related to the prospect of premium increases, is that the state courts will be
inundated with frivolous and costly lawsuits by patients in search of dipping into the
deep pockets of third-party payors.220 Third-party payors contend that this would not
only tax the state courts’ infrastructure, it would also lead to a large increase in
premiums.221 Consumer advocates, however, argue that the introduction of state law
claims against third-party payors covered by ERISA will not result in a large volume
of cases, nor will it result in the predicted onslaught of state law claims against thirdparty payors.222 They point to Texas, where no suits have been brought in the year
since Texas became the first state to let people who have exhausted the available
internal and external appeals sue third-party payors.223 As a result, Texas has
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reported a rise in premiums at a paltry 0.1% per month.224 Third-party payors argue,
however, that the number of suits brought in Texas will rise as soon as patients
realize that they are able to sue third-party payors not covered by ERISA.225 With
many of the arguments, predictions on the increase of state law claims and
subsequent increase in premiums in Texas will only be bourne out as time passes.
Congress, however, cannot discount what is occurring in our nation’s states as a
symbol for what could lie ahead if the preemption clause is significantly altered or
eliminated.
In sum, as the health care industry evolves, so must legislation and the legal
system that regulates it. The elimination of the preemption clause will permit state
courts to delve into the negligent conduct by third-party payors, thereby ensuring
legal remedies for those wronged. Before acting prematurely, Congress should
evaluate the cause and effect of such an action on the four central entities—patient,
provider, self-insured employer, and managed care entities. To clarify the possible
repercussions of rendering moot the preemption clause, the next section explores
how the elimination of the preemption clause impacts these four key players.226
D. How The Elimination Of The Preemption Clause Would Affect Four Entities—
The Patient, The Provider, the Self-Insured Employer, and Managed Care Entities.
Because they are impacted the most the four most important entities in the fate of
the preemption provision are the patient, the provider, the self-insured employer, and
the managed care entities.227 This section considers the impact of Congress passing a
measure permitting patients to sue third-party payors for damages under state law,
thereby disrupting the bargain made between Congress and employers in 1974.228
1. The Patient
The elimination of the preemption clause will, in the short term, enable the
patient to enjoy a boon of newfound ability to access and receive quality health care,
or sue if she doesn’t. If the patient believed she was wronged, she would possess the
ability to obtain monetary remedies for claims, such as negligent administration of a
plan or wrongful death in state court.229 As a result, the patient would effectively
gain another “check” in the checks and balances system of health care.
Presumptively, this “check” should equate to a better opportunity for obtaining
quality health care. For example, an individual in legitimate, medically-necessary
need of treatment should receive the care without an overriding concern that the
utilization review agent will deny the claim, unless it desires to subject itself to the
risk of state law claims. While the short-term prospects look positive for patients,
the long-term impact of such a measure is more suspect.
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Larry Atkins, president of Health Policy Analysts, a Washington consulting
group, states, “it’s impossible to assess the real cost of liability, but its passage would
end managed care’s success in curbing health costs.”230 As aforementioned, there is
a real possibility that the introduction of state law liability will cause an increase in
premiums, thereby making it more expensive to obtain quality health care.231 More
likely than not, the elimination of the preemption clause will create the same type of
repercussions as was created by past government regulation of the health care
industry.232 Health care costs would skyrocket and, without more government
intervention, employers would exit the business of health care benefits altogether and
take with them their purchasing power and their expertise in the business of health
care.233 Arguably, the free-market-based health care system would be thrown into
chaos and the patient could ultimately “get the shaft.”234 While this is one of many
scenarios that could occur through blanket elimination of the preemption clause, by
no means could it be the only outcome. Either way Congress decides to act, as this
article demonstrates, the stakes are high for the patient.
2. The Provider
Senator Sibley from Waco, Texas, states, “why is it that doctors and nurses are
accountable for their health care treatment decisions and managed care companies
are not?”235 With this question, Senator Sibley touches the heart of what providers
(doctors) gain from the elimination of the preemption clause. Doctors argue that the
advent of utilization reviews and managed care has severely hampered their ability to
provide ideal care.236 They advance legitimate concerns, such as a loss of control
over medical decisions, increased restrictions on personal time, and the creation of
financial incentives that strain their professional principles.237 If the preemption
clause is eliminated, doctors believe that third-party payors would grow reluctant to
interfere with the relationship between the physician and the patient, and they would
regain some independence.238 Moreover, third-party payors would have to share the
risk in providing medical care.239
Third-party payors argue, however, that an increase in provider earning power is
not in the best interest of the patient, nor of the nation. They argue that if the clause
is eliminated, doctors would gain in two ways. First, the provider would regain her
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control over medical decisions.240 Second, by regaining control over their own
practices providers would naturally be better able to earn more money which could
mean that health care costs would again heavily burden our nation’s pocket-books.241
It should be noted that there are providers who argue that the elimination of the
preemption clause would do nothing to address root problems inherent in our health
care system, such as expensive medication and inadequate standards of physician
care.242 They maintain, therefore, at the cost of their own personal gains, the
preemption clause should remain intact.243 This loose-fitting group of doctors state,
“Allowing patients to sue health plans [and self-insured employers] . . . will . . .
increase health care costs, further erode physician professional autonomy, encourage
more lawsuits and make it harder to defend individual doctors in those lawsuits.”244
In sum, the impact of the elimination of the preemption clause on the provider is
unclear. On one hand, the provider could gain freedom and earning power. On the
other hand, elimination could lead to “further erosion of [a doctor’s] autonomy” and
increased difficulty in defending oneself from state law litigation which, in the long
run, would further subject doctors’ expertise to that of someone who has no medical
background.245
3. Self-Insured Employers
If self-insured employers are subjected to state law actions, they argue that they
would lose much of their ability to offer health care benefits to their employees.
Furthermore, they posit that if the clause is eliminated, their 1974 compromise with
Congress would be destroyed and, as a result, the federal government would likely
have to, again, legislate large sums of money to care for the increasing numbers of
uninsured Americans.
The elimination of the preemption clause could lead to a mass exodus of selfinsured employers from the health-benefits business and subsequent increases in
patient’s premiums. However, as this article has demonstrated, there are two sides to
every argument. Self-insured employers readily admit that the provision of health
benefits is basically a business decision, that benefits are both a means to ensure a
productive work force and a means to recruit quality employees. While repealing the
preemption clause could lead to an increase in health care costs and premiums, it
would do nothing to stifle these free market desires. Despite the fact that selfinsured employers could now be held liable under state law, the desire to recruit
quality employees and the need to ensure a healthy and positive workforce would
remain.
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4. Managed Care Entities
Third-party payor lobbyists argue that managed care entities create payment
systems and serve as a delivery mechanism in today’s health care landscape.246 They
maintain that one would be hard-pressed to argue the benefits that have been brought
to the table because of the introduction of the managed care entity into our health
care system.247 For example, managed care entities have assisted our nation in
stalling the ever-increasing costs of health care premiums. After rising nearly 15%
annually from 1988 to 1992, because managed care entities have become a mainstay
in the market, health care premiums increased only by 0.5% from 1995 to 1996.248
Managed care entities argue that if the preemption clause is eliminated, the positive
effects gained over the past five years can be forgotten.
Consumer advocates, however, reason if the preemption clause is eliminated,
managed care entities, being a product of the free-market system, will evolve with
the changing landscape simply because there remains a large amount of money to be
earned when creating payment systems and administering health benefits.
Furthermore, self-insured employers and other employers will attempt, although
begrudgingly, to blunt the possibility of increased premiums in order to keep their
own health care costs down. Managed care entities, having responded to a market in
search of health care premium stability, will once again respond to a market that also
includes a possibility of liability in state courts.
In sum, the entire preemption provision question is clouded in uncertainty. The
courts, the politicians, the patients, the providers, the self-insured employers, and
managed care entities, are leery as to what exactly will happen, if and when
Congress eliminates the preemption clause. No one is certain how the health care
market will react. Even if the preemption provision was eliminated, it remains
unclear what patient-employees’ reactions would be to their newly-acquired right to
sue their employers under state law for negligent provision of their health care.249
The only certainty is that the fate of the preemption clause lies within Congress and
the legislative branch, not the judicial branch. Furthermore, it is a forgone
conclusion that self-insured employers and managed care entities will be adversely
impacted, and the patients and the providers would both win and lose.250
IV. CONCLUSION
For our nation to move into the future, it must know and appreciate where it has
been. To know where it has been will enable the nation to navigate and succeed in
the future. This article views history as a tool for current national trials and
tribulations, namely, the fate of the ERISA preemption clause. It argues that when
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deliberating on the fate of the preemption clause, Congress’s analysis must not be
clouded by fear-mongering expressed by third-party payors and consumer advocates
but rather, deliberation must be grounded in past regulatory lessons learned.
Congress’s deliberation over the fate of the preemption clause is extremely
important, impacting many different entities. While recently growing annoyed with
ERISA’s effect on patients, the federal courts, despite rare deviations, have remained
anchored to their interpretation of the preemption clause. But still, third-party
payors’ decisions have life and death implications. Therefore, Congress must take
into account the serious implications of eliminating the preemption clause and
delicately evaluate the pros and cons of such an action. It must also analyze whether
cases like Mrs. Garvey’s symbolize a substantive breakdown of the relationship
between third-party payors, providers, and patients, or whether they represent
anecdotal events marketed to the public so that entities, such as doctors and
consumers, could prosper at the expense of the others interests.
This article concludes by noting an age-old proverb of the Iroquois people. Their
proverb maintains that for every deliberation, one must consider the next seven
generations. In order to retain a quality health care system that provides care at an
affordable price, Congress must consider the impact of eliminating the clause on “the
next seven generations” rather than react to the third-party payors’ lobbyists or the
consumer advocates’ emotions of the moment.
In 1994, many political pundits believed with the election of the Republicans to a
majority of seats in Congress, the public effectively rejected the idea of universal
health care and sent a message to Congress that health care should be regulated
through the “market place.”251 Whereas in 1999, sparked by the 1994 Republican
effort to fund tax cuts with huge chunks of money taken from Medicare,252 the
American public seems to have changed its mind on how exactly health care should
be addressed.253 It appears that much of the public believes that the free-market
system is not providing the checks and balances needed to ensure quality care at
affordable costs; therefore, federal regulation may be necessary to ensure quality
service at an affordable cost.254
In an effort to address the preemption clause’s adverse impact on patient’s rights,
Congress could re-visit the idea of universal health care. This time, however,
Congress could expand its vision of what universal health care could be. Congress
could eliminate the preemption clause so as to permit patients to obtain legal
251
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remedies in state court. Congress must simultaneously, however, provide financial
subsidies to third-party payors to persuade them to work diligently in controlling the
possible meteoric rise in costs of premiums and liability insurance. If a third-party
payor is abusing its discretion and committing an inordinate amount of negligent
acts, the subsidy amount can be reduced accordingly. This dual approach will not
only provide quality health care to patients, but it will also provide a safety-net for
those citizens unable to access affordable health care. Admittedly, this proposal’s
downside is that the American people are not likely prepared to pay additional taxes
necessary to support such a subsidizing system. Yet, when faced with the
alternative, “the people” may have no choice.
Perhaps the most logical and reasonable solution requires Congress to complete
two tasks. First, it must leave the preemption clause alone because its existence
stems any chance of inconsistent standards and judgments. Furthermore, because the
state courts never obtain jurisdiction, it stops any fear of an increase in state law
claims that would be burdensome on state infrastructures. Second, Congress must
amend the civil enforcement mechanism located within ERISA. As noted in the
introduction, the civil enforcement mechanism currently provides the patient with
compensation for refused medical procedures. There is, however, no reason why
Congress could not draft a clause providing punitive damages with a stipulation that
damages cannot exceed five million dollars. The cap will provide adequate remedy
for the patient, serve as a punishment for negligent acts by third-party payors, and
because federal courts retain jurisdiction, negate any possibility of inconsistent and
biased state judgements. Capped punitive damages and retention of the consistent
and dependable federal courts should contain any possibility of an extreme increase
in the cost of health care premiums.
This proposal’s downside is the monetary cap amount. For example, if this
system was in place for Mrs. Garvey, how much should the cap allow for
compensating her family for the loss of life? Her husband, like most, would argue
that five million dollars is not enough to compensate her family for the loss of a
mother, a wife, a care-giver. In sum, with regard to the monetary cap and third-party
payors, the cap must be high enough to serve as a deterrent of future negligent
actions, but low enough to permit third-party payors to withstand the health care
business absent restrictive civil remedies.
While proposals can be drafted and the future of health care can be debated,
whether Congress eliminates the preemption clause will not solve our health care
crisis. Uwe Reinhardt states,
until the American public makes up its mind as to what it thinks health
care is, the health- care system will remain irrational—[the public]
want[s] an egalitarian health care system run by libertarian means” . . .
“[T]he key question . . . is whether health care is a community
service/public good or a private-consumer commodity.255
In the past, health care reform has been driven by excess—excess beds, excess
doctors, excess capacity—created by a series of well-intentioned, but poorly thought
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out, government mandates.256 Americans must understand that within our current
health care system, medical ethics clash with business profits.257 While the
American people cry out for more care and “better care . . . for less money,”258 they
forget, and perhaps do not understand that more care and “better care . . . for less
money” are “inextricably linked.”259 If we eliminate the preemption clause, as David
Broder, the Washington Post journalist, suggests,
requiring insurers, providers (and employers) to do more inevitably means
they will charge more. Under our bifurcated system, some of the people
who pay the bills (employers) will decide that the happiness of those who
receive the services (patients) has become too expensive a luxury and will
stop insuring them.”260
Ruth Coleman states, “the words—managed health-care—is a misnomer . . .
[rather] since World War II, what we have in this country is managed-health[care]
finance, not managed-health care.”261 Until the nation decides which way it desires
its health care system to evolve—universal or not universal—Congress’s simple
deletion of the preemption clause from ERISA will be another example of “managed
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health care finance” passed in the name of managed health care and sure enough, the
patient will once again lose out.
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